On the 15th of April I sent the following in an email to Marine Surveyor Jim Walsh of Overseas Maritime to explain why we were requesting his services. 

It encapsulates the experiences we had with the boat and why we had reached the stage where we no longer had any faith in its safety and why we had reached the stage where we felt we needed an expert to take a look over it and provide us with the information we needed to make a sensible decision on how to proceed.

The boat is brand new and was collected on the 11th of February this
year.

The most recent and serious problem was a total electrical failure whilst
my husband and son were underway in the dark in a busy shipping area
headed into Argostoli marina and in the path of a bulk carrier. This
happened the night before last.

A serious accident was avoided only thanks to providence and my
husband having a great deal of experience as a sailor and being a qualified
power boat instructor - otherwise I could easily be a widow and childless
today.

It was found that the cause of this was a small plastic packet of electrical
fixings that had been in the accessory socket (presumably since the socket
was fitted) which then fused the accessory socket and took with it all the
equipment and lights and one of the craft's twin engines.

The builder has stated he has no idea how this caused total failure as it
should only have taken out the accessory socket.

He said that the packet was 'an oversight in the pre-delivery checking
procedure'!

There have been various problems of various severity encountered since
we towed the craft back to Greece from the UK.

The main ones are:

A number of protruding sharp points (the points of screws fixing the turn
buckles for the winter cover) into the cabin area which have caused injury
which the builder has been aware of for more than 6 weeks, accepted
responsibility for but done nothing to effect a remedy.

A bimini frame with insecure fixings that fell apart and caused injury
whilst underway and a bimini which is not according to the specifications
we requested to the point where it cannot be used, and which has been
accepted by the builder to be so bad that he had already agreed to refund
us and pay for collection - before the latest electrical fault.

The craft is generally of poor finish and given we paid over £37,000 for it
and following the latest extremely frightening incident we have taken legal
advice and informed the builder that we are rejecting the craft and seeking
a professional structural survey in anticipation of litigation. Our solicitor
is also keen that any surveyor used should be experienced if possible in
giving expert evidence if necessary.

The boat is being lifted out of the water today, which is where Andy is at
the moment so I am replying to you to save time.

Mr Walsh attended and spent the day with the boat examining it and determining why we had experienced the power failure that we had.

Here are the main findings from the report.  I have edited simply to improve readability and I haven't changed any words or order of words.

7. Summary of Defects
          7.1. Design Defects
              7.1.1. No grab handles in cockpit
              7.1.2. Cushions not made to allow easy access to lockers
              7.1.3. Locker lids with no retaining mechanism to keep them open
              7.1.4. On/Off switch panel for fuse board poorly positioned
              7.1.5. Forward boarding ladder secured with spring loaded ball catch but no
                         provision for safety pin securing.
              7.1.6. Echo sounder not working at high speed due to positioning.
              7.1.7. No provision to hide unsightly cabling in cockpit.
              7.1.8. Bimini Frame with insecure fittings that fell apart while underway.
              7.1.9. Bimini Fibre straps had unsatisfactory mode of securing.
              7.1.10. Batteries difficult to access
              7.1.11. Batteries not ventilated
         
          7.2. Materials Defects
             7.2.1. Windscreen sealant had not set and was adherent and dirty to the touch.
             7.2.2. Water ski pillar base of galvanised not stainless steel.
             7.2.3. Steering bushes and bolts of mild steel.
             7.2.4. Keel bands with corrosion as not stainless steel

       7.3. Production Defects
           7.3.1. Boat delivered with builders off-cuts and production dust underneath
                      plastic packaging.
           7.3.2. Chartplotter installed too close to throttle
           7.3.3. Antifouling peeled away from keel band area
           7.3.4. Gel coat not properly applied underneath elastic rubbing strake
           7.3.5. Plastic packet of electrical fittings in electrical socket leading to short
                      circuit and loss of power while underway.
           7.3.6. Velcro for mosquito netting fore and aft attached wrong way round (soft
                      part on netting, hard part on cover)
           7.3.7. Keel bands Improperly joined at midships part
           7.3.8. Bimini Frame Grub screws not tightened by manufacturer.
           7.3.9. Steering Threads mismatched
           7.3.10. Main fuse 10Ampere whilst accessory socket had 15Ampere instead of
                        being lower than the main fuse.
           7.3.11. Steering sloppy as no oil put in steering gear by manufacturer
           7.3.12. Bolt heads protruding in aft part of cuddy
           7.3.13. Steering Hydraulic cylinder attached to hull by unsightly too long bolts
           7.3.14. Screws for winter cover turnbuckles protrude into passenger area
           7.3.15. Electrical cable in console with cable join covered with electrical tape.
           7.3.16. Batteries without covers to bare terminals
           7.3.17. Batteries without ventilation
           7.3.18. Mess of wiring in console

        7.4. Not as per order
           7.4.1. Side panels not as per client order (Non-transparent zipped instead of roll
                      up doors with removable mosquito netting)

8. CE Compliance

EC Directive 94/25/EC notes the following:

5.3 Electrical systems shall be designed and installed so as to ensure
proper operation of the craft under normal conditions of use and shall be
such as to minimise risk of fire and electric shock.
Attention shall be paid to the provision of overload and short-circuit
protection of all circuits except engine starting circuits, supplied from
batteries.
Ventilation shall be provided to prevent the accumulation of gases which
might be emitted from batteries. Batteries shall be firmly secured and
protected from ingress of water.

             8.1. The relevant defects are as follows:
                     Plastic packet of electrical fittings in electrical socket leading to short
                     circuit and loss of power and loss of one engine while underway.
                     Main fuse 10Ampere whilst accessory socket had 15Ampere instead of
                     lower than main fuse.
                     Electrical cable in console with cable join covered with electrical tape
                     Batteries difficult to access and without covers on bare terminals
                     Batteries without covers to bare terminals
                     Batteries not ventilated

            8.2. This particular craft appeared to be in violation of CE compliance in
                     respect of the electrical installation. Whether this is typical of this model
                     or simply due to errors in production is unknown.
            8.3. The difficulty to access batteries with bare terminals is an electric shock
                     risk. The mess of wiring around the batteries makes access very difficult.
            8.4. The lack of ventilation to the batteries with the bare terminals as source
                     of ignition is a fire/explosion risk.
            8.5. The plastic packet of electrical fittings negligently left in the socket during
                    production compromised the proper operation of the craft causing loss of
                    power and loss of one engine while underway.
            8.6. The main fuse being lower than the accessory socket fuse contributed to
                    the loss of power incident and this fuse system was again in violation of
                   the directive.

9. Conclusion
The cost of the craft is taken into consideration, which is not a small sum
and therefore the design, materials, production and finish would be
expected to be to a reasonable standard of quality.
The manufacturer is noted to have been in operation for 10 years
therefore would have been expected to have achieved a good standard of
production.
It should be mentioned that the craft is a production boat and not a oneoff
or heavily customised boat.
The general condition of the craft was therefore surprising.
The electrical issues have already been dealt with above therefore we will
discuss further the other issues.

        9.1. Lack of Quality Control
                From the production defects of the craft it is clear that the craft did not
                undergo proper quality control and was shipped to the customer without
                production defects being corrected, as follows:
                Boat delivered with builders’ off-cuts and production dust underneath
                plastic packaging.
                Steering sloppy as no oil put in steering gear by manufacturer
                Bimini Frame Grub screws not tightened by manufacturer
                Chartplotter installed too close to throttle
                Antifouling peeled away from keel band area
                Gel coat not properly applied underneath elastic rubbing strake
                Keel bands Improperly joined at midships part
                The reason for this is unknown but the manufacturers’ quality control
                system clearly failed in this instance, as it should have identified all these
                defects.
                The lack of steering oil is a safety issue as it affects the control of the
                craft.
                The chartplotter should have been installed using an approved template to
                ensure correct positioning. It is clear this was not arranged.

        9.2. Unacceptable materials used
               There were various unacceptable materials used in production which
               meant the craft would lose value quickly, as follows:
               Windscreen sealant had not set and was adherent and dirty to the touch.
               Water ski pillar base of galvanised not stainless steel.
               Steering bushes and bolts of mild steel.
               Keel bands with corrosion as not stainless steel
               Only several months after delivery, these materials were seen to be already
               corroding therefore the manufacturer has made an unreasonable economy
               in selecting these cheaper materials. These materials would be more
               commonly seen on low end, low cost craft not on craft priced at the level
              of the craft in question.
              The manufacturers’ website makes reference to stainless steel Keel Bands
              for this exact model, however they were not as such on this craft.

       9.3. Defective materials or Design Issues
               There were various items as follows, which were poorly selected in
               procurement.
               Bimini Frame with insecure fittings that fell apart while underway.
               Bimini Fibre straps had unsatisfactory mode of securing.
               Forward boarding ladder secured with spring loaded ball catch but no
               provision for safety pin securing.
               Steering Threads mismatched
               The Bimini frame and securing was accepted by the manufacturer as
               defective.
               The forward boarding ladder is noted as having poorly designed fittings,
               which do not have a safe mode of securing. This is a safety issue for
               persons boarding with this ladder.

The echo sounder was also poorly positioned, which is a design issue and
indeed a safety issue also.
Echo sounder not working at high speed due to positioning.
The manufacturer should have been aware that this positioning would
affect performance at high speed.
The mismatched steering threads are a serious safety issue due to the
forces involved.

9.4. Design issues affecting ergonomics
There were various issues of ergonomics which had not been considered
by the manufacturer, as follows:
No grab handles in cockpit
Cushions not made to allow easy access to lockers
Locker lids with no retaining mechanism to keep them open
On/Off switch panel for fuse board poorly positioned
Velcro for mosquito netting fore and aft attached wrong way round (soft
part on netting, hard part on cover)
The lack of grab handles in the cockpit is a serious safety issue for a fast
craft.
The positioning of the fuse panel is a safety issue as it is close to the
helmsman's knee therefore the switches are contacted is normal use.
The photographs of the same model on the manufacturers’ website show a
better positioning of the fuse panel than as positioned on the craft in
question. Whilst on the craft it is positioned to the left, in the
photographs it is better positioned in the centre.
9.5. Not Leisure Boat Standard
The craft is noted to be a leisure boat therefore the finish would be
expected to be to a reasonable standard.
The following defects are relevant.
No provision to hide unsightly cabling in cockpit.
Sharp screws for winter cover turnbuckles protrude into passenger area
Bolt heads protruding in aft part of cuddy
Steering Hydraulic cylinder attached to hull by unsightly too long bolts
The cabling could have easily been hidden in some conduit or behind
panelling but the manufacturer did not make any provision for this.
The sharp ends of screws protruding into the passenger area would not
have been acceptable even on a work-boat and are an unacceptable safety
issue. Bolts would have been more appropriate if they were of a correct
length.
These are rather surprising issues which would have been so easy to
correct.

9.6. General Opinion
9.6.1. The view was formed the craft had been built with undue lack of care and
attention, the batteries and electrics are unsafe, the steering is faulty and
with incorrect fittings, the protruding screw heads are dangerous. Some
fittings were of unknown thread and important parts of the steering were
of mild steel, not inox.
9.6.2. I could only describe the finish to the craft as being of an amateur nature
and not fit for purpose.

10. Statement of Truth
10.1. I believe that the facts stated in this report are true and that the opinions
I have expressed are correct. I understand that it is my duty to assist the
Court on matters that fall within my expertise and that this duty overrides
any obligation to the party who engaged me. I believe that I have
complied with that duty.

11. Curriculum Vitae
11.1. Jim Walsh BSc(Hons),CEng,FRINA,FIMarEST,FCMS
11.2. Memberships: -
Fellow of the Institute of Marine Engineers
Fellow of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Fellow of the Society of Consulting Marine Engineers & Ship Surveyors
Past Chairman of the Hellenic Joint Branch of the Institute of Marine
Engineers and the Royal Institution of Naval Architects
11.3. Appointments: -
Bahamas Maritime Nautical Inspector
Barbados Maritime Nautical Inspector
Luxembourg Flag Appointed Nautical Inspector
MCA appointed Small Craft Examiner
11.4. Education & Training: -
Chief Engineer’s Certificate Steam & Motor 1970
First Class Honours Degree in Mechanical Engineering 1974
The Institution of Mechanical Engineers Prize 1974
Yacht Master’s Certificate 1995 and participating in that year’s Fastnet
Race.
11.5. Professional Background: -
Sea service with Elders & Fyffes, Canadian Pacific & BP Tankers.
Employment in the Design Department of BP in London engaged in the
plan appraisal of New Building Product Tankers.
Served as a Chief Engineer on a Greek managed tanker.
Employed as a Lecturer II at the Liverpool Polytechnic teaching
Undergraduates, and Marine Engineers studying for Certificates of
Competency.
Carried out research into the displacement of thin cylinders under bending
for the British Atomic Energy Authority.
Engaged in the formation of an Engineering facility at the then Cargo
Survey practice Brookes Bell & Co. in Liverpool in 1975, became partner
of that firm.
Founded Surveying & Technical Consultancy Overseas Maritime in 1980.
11.6. Surveys carried out: -
Pre-Purchase Inspections.
Pre-Entry and Condition Surveys for P&I and Hull Insurance Purposes.
Nautical Safety Inspections for Bahamas, Barbados and Luxembourg
Maritime Authorities.
Cargo Surveys on numerous dry commodities, oil cargoes, bunkers and
Containers. Pre-loading Surveys and Loading Surveys.
Sailing and Motor Yacht Inspections and MCA Small Craft Examiners’
Inspections.
Bunker Surveys, measurements, disputes as to quantity and quality, offspecification
claims, sampling and analysis.
On-hire and Off-hire Surveys.
Towage Approval Surveys.
Monitoring of Ship Repairs and Dry-Dock Attendance.
Draught Surveys and Hatch Un-Sealing Surveys.
11.7. Investigations performed: -
Total or Constructive Total losses in instances of Grounding, Flooding,
Fire & Explosion, Engine Breakdowns, and Collisions.
Personal Injuries on board vessels.
Investigations of Speed and Consumption disputes.
Charter Party Disputes.
Cause and extent of damages following collisions with other vessels and
contact with fixed objects and undersea pipelines.
Cause and extent of damages following collapse of ‘tween deck.
Cause and extent of damages following collapse of deck.
Investigations into Engine Breakdowns, and Main Engine Damage.
Investigations into cause and extent of damages following fire and
explosion.
Investigations into cause and extent of Vessel Grounding, and Capsizing.
Technical Expert for SCOPIC over re-floating of vessels following
grounding.
Investigations into cause of sinking and fuel removal.
General Average Surveys.
Cause and extent of damage following heavy weather damage to vessel’s
structure and cargo.
Damage regarding Hull, Rudder, Propeller, Ice damage, Tail shaft, and
Crankshaft damage, damage to Keel, Shell damage, Side Plating damage,
Derrick and Crane damages, Windlass damage, Tank Top damage,
Stevedore damages.
Investigation into cause and extent of Pollution.
Ship Stability Investigations
Yacht Inspections following Fire, Sinking, Collision, Grounding, Repair
disputes, Paint Coating problems.
11.8. Types of Vessels involved with: -
General Cargo Vessels
Bulk Carriers
‘tween Deck General Cargo Ships
Oil Tankers
Gas Tankers
Cement Carriers
Container Vessels
Car Carriers
Passenger and Cruise Vessels, Ferries
Ro-Ro Vessels
Motor and Sailing Yachts, Mega-Yachts.
Bunker barges
Hovercraft
Heavy Lift Vessels
Tugs and Floating Cranes
Fishing Vessels

Over the past 29 years as Overseas Maritime following 5 years with
Brookes, Bell, I have been involved in approximately 15,000 Surveys,
Investigations or Opinions provided as a Marine Surveyor and Technical
Consultant or was the Team Leader.

I will put photos tomorrow.